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Public policies are the outcome of the interaction among a variety of key political 
actors, each with its own preferences and incentives, who meet in different arenas 
and interact within the constraints of the institutions that frame their engagement. 
Therefore, to recognize the reasons behind the success or failure of any public 
policy it is necessary to understand the country’s political institutions and the 
policymaking process they in turn help shape.  
This document looks at a number of those key actors, institutions, and 
arenas, with the aim of examining the roles, incentives, and capabilities of each of 
the actors in the policymaking process, by drawing from an extensive literature in 
political science and political economy. Each of the actors is looked at 
individually but connected to the other actors by linking the impact of political 
institutions on their incentives to the features of the policymaking game. 
Hopefully, this document will provide researchers with the tools necessary 
to embark in the fascinating analysis of policymaking processes not only for Latin 







                                                           
∗ This paper, which draws extensively on Scartascini and Olivera (2003), is adapted from a chapter in the 
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Recent experience of countries in Latin America show that reforms with similar orientation and 
content can have very diverse results. At least part of the explanation is that policies are not 
implemented in a vacuum. On the contrary, they are drafted, approved and implemented within 
the context of a country’s political institutions. These political institutions, as well as the 
policymaking processes they in turn help shape, can have a profound impact on the success or 
failure of any policy. In order to understand the process by which policies come into fruition, 
Tommasi and others (Spiller and Tommasi, 2003; IDB, 2005; Stein et al.,  2007), building on a 
core of previous literature, have developed a framework to study the policymaking process 
(PMP).
1 
Within the PMP framework, public policies are seen as the outcome of the interaction 
among a variety of political actors. These actors, each with its own preferences and incentives—
and within the constraints of the rules that frame their engagement—meet in different arenas to 
define public policies. This document looks at a number of those key actors, institutions, and 
arenas, with the aim of examining the roles, incentives, and capabilities of each of the actors in 
the policymaking process.  
This document, which draws from an extensive literature in political science and political 
economy, does not pretend to be a complete survey; rather, it highlights those institutions and 
actors that are important within the context of the PMP framework.
2 While the framework 
emphasizes the interaction among actors, this document examines them individually, for the 
most part. When possible, it links the role of political institutions to the features of the 
policymaking game (also called “features of cooperation”), trying to associate the incentives of 
the actors with the results of the game in which they participate.  
In the PMP framework, the ability of actors to cooperate or engage in intertemporal 
transactions takes central stage as a determinant of the features of public policies. Understanding 
whether actors have more or fewer incentives to engage in intertemporal transactions is 
                                                           
1 Related literature includes Haggard and McCubbins (2001), and Tsebelis (2002). There are also some excellent 
books on comparative politics of Latin America, focusing on specific institutional features in various countries.  
These include edited volumes such as Mainwaring and Scully (1995) on party systems, Mainwaring and Shugart 
(1997) on constitutional and partisan powers of the president, Carey and Shugart (1998) on executive decree 
authority, and Morgenstern (2002) on legislative politics.    
  5
important because it makes possible the inference of the characteristics of public policies. 
Basically, if actors have longer term horizons and interact repeatedly, there is a higher 
probability that they would be willing to accept policies that will mature in the future. On the 
contrary, if actors have short-term horizons, they interact infrequently and there are no 
enforcement or commitment mechanism for the brokered deals, there is a higher probability that 
they will only pursue policies with short-run (usually political) benefits.
3 
Each section of the document analyzes specific actors in the policymaking processes, as 
well as the political institutions shaping their roles and incentives. The order used follows the 
traditional layout of institutions presented in the constitution of a country. Usually, democratic 
constitutions assign the role of policymaking to three separate but related branches—the 
executive (and cabinet), the legislature, and the judiciary—establishing the prerogatives, 
functions, and scope of these institutions. Additionally, there is sometimes a vertical dimension 
of institutions (federalism) that regulates the relationships between the central and subnational 
governments. Finally, the document analyzes the role of other actors with formally ascribed roles 
in the policymaking process, such as political parties and the bureaucracy. At the end of the 
paper appear tables that correspond to preceding sections of the paper and provide information 
on the theoretical relationship between the political institution under study and the determinants 
of cooperation. Whenever possible, the direction of the relationship is also included. 
Additionally, the tables include some guidance on measures used by the literature for quantifying 
some of the relationships discussed in each section.
4 These measures, along with their description 
and sources are presented in the Appendix. 
As a first approximation to the contents of the document, Table 1 presents an overview of 
the main relationships between political institutions and the features of the game of political 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
2 Other sources that should be considered for a complementary, more comprehensive, and substantial overview 
include Weaver and Rockman (1993); Mueller (1996a, 1996b, 2003); Carey (2000); Persson and Tabellini (2000, 
2003); Haggard and McCubbins (2001); Payne et al. (2002); Tsebelis (2002); and IDB (2005). 
3 More generally, drawing from intuitions from the theory of repeated games, cooperation is more likely if: the 
immediate benefits from deviating from cooperative behavior are small; there are good “aggregation technologies” 
so that the number of actors with direct impact on policymaking is small; these key actors have long horizons and 
they interact repeatedly; there are well-institutionalized arenas for political exchange; and there are credible 
enforcement technologies, such as an independent judiciary or a strong bureaucracy, to which certain public policies 
can be delegated. 
4 For example, the literature has shown a direct relationship between the degree of proportionality of the electoral 
system and the degree of fragmentation of the legislature (Cox, 1997). Then, for the purpose of understanding which 
is the relevant number of actors in the legislature, researchers could use the effective number of players in the 
legislature (Table 3)  
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transactions that will be discussed throughout this document. The table shows the relevance of 
the design of the institutional framework of a country on the chances of attaining intertemporal 
cooperation. For example, given the political regime, particular combinations of the electoral 
system for the legislature and executive branch prerogatives generate different probabilities of 
cooperation. Of course, the first-tier political institutions that we survey in this document are not 
the sole determinants. Similar institutional configurations could lead to different policy outcomes 
due to the existence of second or third-tier institutional differences, such as the degree of 
discretion of the executive branch in the execution of the budget (IDB, 2005).  
 
2. Executive Branch: Presidents and Cabinets 
 
Countries can organize their executive branch along a “continuum” between two polar cases: 
presidential and parliamentary systems.
5 The choice of political regime between presidential and 
parliamentary systems can have important consequences for policymaking because it has an 
influence on the number and stability of the agents in charge of policymaking, the arenas where 
exchanges take place, the type of political exchanges that can take place between the executive 
and the legislature, and some of the bargaining prerogatives of each of the actors.  
Latin American countries have traditionally opted for presidential regimes, instead of the 
parliamentary systems that are more popular in Europe. Even though this study focuses on 
presidential systems, it is important to characterize both systems, insofar as this discussion helps 
introduce the literature and stylized facts on stability of governments and policies. In fact, some 
critics argue that some of the problems with policymaking in Latin America have their origin in 
the region’s choice of political regime.  
The stylized facts indicate that parliamentary systems tend to be less stable than 
presidential systems because political government leaders tend to change more frequently. 
However, when changes occur in parliamentary systems, they are usually smooth and do not 
involve a complete reshuffling of the government; some of the policymakers remain in place, 
along with their policies.  On the other hand, changes in presidential systems are more dramatic 
                                                           
5 Lijphart (1999) identifies three basic differences between presidential and parliamentary systems.  First, the 
executive in a parliamentary system is responsible to the legislature and can be dismissed from office by a 
legislative vote of no confidence or censure.  In a presidential system, the head of government is elected for a 
constitutionally prescribed period.  Second, prime ministers are selected by the legislature, while presidents are 
popularly elected.  Third, parliamentary systems have collective or collegial executives, whereas presidential 
systems have single-person, noncollegial executives.  
  7
because they entail either a democratic breakdown or a major reshuffle of the government. In 
that context, Linz (1990, 1994) has characterized presidential systems as “rigid” and 
parliamentary systems as “flexible.” In his work, flexibility is to be preferred to rigidity, 
especially because flexibility is risk-minimizing (for example, crises in parliamentary systems 
would be government crises, and not regime crises). Thus the rigidity of presidentialism, 
crystallized in situations where presidents lack a majority of seats in legislatures, was thought to 
be one of the main determinants of the breakdown of democratic regimes in Latin America 
(Linz, 1994). This argument regarding the relationship between minority governments and 
regime survival has been empirically tested by recent scholarship.  
On the one hand, based on data for all presidential democracies that existed between 
1946 and 1996, Cheibub and collaborators show that minority presidents, minority governments, 
and deadlock situations do not affect the survival of democracies (Cheibub, 2002; Cheibub and 
Limongi 2002; Cheibub, Przeworksi, and Saiegh 2004). On the other hand, based on a much 
smaller sample of Latin American governments between 1978 and 2005, Chasquetti (2004) and 
IDB (2005) note that in this period, a number of minority governments (defined as situations 
where governments control less than 45 percent of legislative seats) suffered constitutional 
interruptions (situations where either the president or congress does not finish the terms for 
which they were elected). For this selected group of countries, IDB (2005) finds that minority 
governments (whether single party or coalitional) were five times more likely to suffer 
constitutional interruptions than governments with a majority or near majority of seats  
Considering the fact that the modal type of party system in Latin America is a multiparty 
one, the ability of governments to form and maintain majority coalitions should be considered an 
important factor that may affect political stability (or the lack thereof) in the region. In the case 
of Ecuador, a country where presidents have a minority of the seats in the legislature (lately 
around 25 percent) and where coalitions tend to be unstable, no president has finished his four-




The regime type adopted in Latin America makes presidents key players in the policymaking 
game. Therefore, it is important to understand their incentives and the factors affecting 
presidential behavior. Even though their personal qualities, ideology, and historical and cultural  
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factors can shape the way presidents govern, the institutions that determine the way they are 
elected and their power to affect policy decisions tend to be at least as important in explaining 
their incentives and behavior. In some institutional contexts, presidents tend to be mostly 
interested in the public good and design their policies taking into account broad interests in 
society. In other institutional contexts, presidents have “mixed” incentives and are driven by 
personal and political goals that may interfere with the goal of serving the general public interest. 
While differences in incentives are explained mostly by electoral rules, the capacity to transform 
policies depends on the powers bestowed on the presidents, which are discussed next.  
  
Presidential Powers   
The powers of the president determine the strategic actions the president may take, and the type 
of transactions s/he may engage in with the legislature and his/her political allies and opponents. 
Presidential powers can be classified as either constitutional powers or partisan powers (Shugart 
and Carey, 1992; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997). 
Constitutional powers contribute to framing the relationship between the executive and 
the legislative.  As the constitutional powers of the presidency increase, other things being equal, 
so does the president’s discretion to introduce changes to the status quo. Higher constitutional 
powers make it easier for the president to take decisive action whenever it is necessary (such as 
adapting economic policy to shocks), but they also make it easier to change policies for political 
convenience, leading to a potential volatility of policies (such as changing policies before an 
election for political gain and discarding the policies of the previous administration and “starting 
all over” after taking office). Constitutional powers can be divided into legislative and 
nonlegislative powers.   
Legislative powers include the package veto, the partial (line item) veto, the power to 
issue decrees or declare a bill “urgent,”
6 the exclusive initiative of legislation, budgetary powers, 
and the power to call a plebiscite or referendum. These powers can be further divided into 
proactive and reactive, according to whether the president can influence the adoption of policies 
that represent a change in the status quo or whether the president can stop or delay the 
implementation of policies that could modify the status quo (Carey and Shugart, 1998). If 
                                                           
6 Decree is the authority of the executive to establish law without prior consent of the assembly (Carey and Shugart, 
1998).  This may include executive policy initiatives that eventually require legislative ratification. Urgency bills are 
proposals issued by the president and become law unless the legislature acts to reject them within a specified period.  
  9
legislative presidential powers are important, policies will be closer to the preferences of the 
executive branch. For example, the president could obtain policies closer to his or her 
preferences by threatening to veto or actually vetoing the legislature, by issuing decrees and thus 
bypassing the legislature, and by using the prerogative to consult the citizenry through 
referendums to bypass the opposition of the legislature for those policies for which the president 
can ensure popular support (Mueller, 1996a, 1996b).
7  
The president’s nonlegislative  powers  include the power to nominate, appoint, and 
dismiss government officials. If the president has sole discretion over the appointment of   
government officials, she can use those powers not only to pursue her agenda by appointing loyal 
members of the party, but also to cement coalitions whenever necessary by offering potential 
coalition partners positions in the government (e.g., ministries). Additionally, the president can 
use those prerogatives as a signaling (and commitment) mechanism for certain policies by 
appointing individuals whose preferences are widely known and respected (e.g., a conservative 
economist as central banker or a renowned religious leader for a human rights position). 
If the rules provide the legislature with power over the appointment of government 
officials (e.g., in the United States, certain top government officials must be confirmed by the 
Senate), it may affect the relationship between the executive and legislative branches, because 
legislators could use those prerogatives as a bargaining mechanism with the executive over 
policies of interest.
8 If the legislature has the prerogative of dismissing a government official 
from her post through a vote of censure, the power of the president may be weaker, since it 
provides a tool the legislature can use to undermine and harass the executive (Payne et al., 2002). 
Consequently, mechanisms such as the impeachment of the president and government officials 
become another institutional dimension relevant in the study of presidential powers and 
executive-legislative relations. Even though the possibility of removing the president from office 
may be regarded as an exceptional measure, the nature of the impeachment process could affect 
the degree of vulnerability of the president vis-à-vis Congress. If overly politicized, the 
                                                           
7 The relevance of the elements of direct democracy (referendum, popular initiative) has been  highlighted as one of 
the resources at the disposal of the executive branch to pass certain policies when the legislature is opposed to them.  
The literature on popular initiative, based on the tradition of Romer and Rosenthal (1978, 1979, 1982), shows that 
the agenda-setter has good possibilities of having its policies supported by maximizing support through popular 
votes, given the preferences of the voters and the status quo (reversionary position). 
8 The dynamics and outcomes of the appointment game are shaped by the rules: who is the agenda setter, what is  
the number of voters needed to approve or reject a candidate, etc. (Shugart and Carey, 1992; Amorim Neto, 2002;  
Payne et al., 2002; IDB, 2005, Martínez Gallardo, 2005).   
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possibility of impeachment could also be a source of political as well as policy instability. Latin 
American constitutions provide three main ways to remove the president from office: 
congressional, judicial and mixed models of impeachment (Pérez, 2006). While in the 
congressional model the authorization and trial of the president take place in the assembly, in the 
judicial model the trial is conducted by the judiciary (the Supreme Court). Finally, mixed models 
of impeachment combine elements of the first two, depending on the nature of the offense. 
Regardless of the model in use, a key constitutional provision is the decision threshold in 
use: that is, the legislative majorities required to proceed with an impeachment process. While 
some procedures are more restrictive (requiring supermajorities), others are more permissive 
(simple majorities). However, constitutional rules are not the whole story. In fact, these rules can 
only be assessed in interaction with the capacity of presidents to mobilize support among 
members of Congress (Pérez, 2006). This takes us into the realm of the partisan powers of 
presidents, a key variable whose importance goes far beyond the impeachment process, and to 
which we now turn. 
Partisan  powers relate to the degree of support for the president in congress. The 
standard measures are the size of the president’s legislative contingent and the degree of party 
discipline (Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997).  Dominant parties capable of ruling by themselves 
(in presidential systems, presidents and legislatures of the same party, especially if the party is a 
“centralized” one)
9 have the easiest time securing legislative support for their programs.   
Coalition governments fare less well, and presidential systems in which the president and 
legislature are of different parties have the greatest difficulty (Haggard and Webb, 2000).  
Sometimes, presidents can still govern in cases of minority government: they can 
circumvent potential opposition in the legislature by relying on the legitimacy provided by strong 
popular support. To a certain extent, the degree of support and legitimacy can be traced back to 
the electoral system that rules the election of presidents, the electoral system that rules the 






                                                           
9 Centralized parties are those where national politicians have tight control over the valuable resources needed to 




Presidents can be directly elected using plurality voting or runoff elections, or they can be 
indirectly elected, either through an electoral college or by legislative decision (usually as a 
“second round” mechanism, as in Bolivia). The method of election of the president is 
particularly relevant, as it affects the degree of popular support of the president and determines 
whether forming a coalition is necessary for obtaining the presidency. Electoral systems that 
ensure a high share of the vote for the winning candidate (particularly in the first round) tend to 
increase legitimacy and reduce the need for coalitions. As discussed in the next section, the 
electoral rules of the legislature also affect the extent to which coalitions are needed to govern by 
affecting the degree of fragmentation of congress—and thus the probability that the president 
could get a majority in congress. Having to rely on coalitions to govern usually creates 
restrictions for the president in the bargaining process, as the cases of Brazil, Chile, and Ecuador 
show (Stein et al., 2007).   
In addition to the formulas that transform votes into seats, other institutional aspects of 
electoral rules are important, including the concurrence of elections and the use of midterm 
elections. When elections are concurrent for the two branches, the president’s party is likely to 
receive more votes, and fewer parties are likely to receive significant shares of the vote in 
legislative elections.  This reduces fragmentation and increases the chance that the president can 
win strong legislative support (Jones, 1997; Shugart, 1995).  Midterm elections, whether in 
systems with or without coterminous cycles, can contribute to difficulties in governing, mainly if 
opposition majorities result (Shugart, 1995). These elections can weaken the policymaking 
effectiveness of the executive by altering the balance of partisan power mid-way through the 
term, and by shifting congressional attention from the policy agenda to electoral strategizing and 
campaigning.  
In addition to explaining the president’s relationship with the legislature, it is also 
relevant to explore the determinants of the president’s relationship with the party. One of those 
determinants is the nomination procedure of presidential candidates.  Some of the systems 
increase the allegiance of presidents to the party, while other systems tend to favor the 
appearance of “extra-party” candidates (Morgenstern and Siavelis, 2004). For example, when the 
selection of presidential candidates is centralized (controlled by party elites) and high barriers for 
independent candidacies exist, it will be more likely for party insiders to become presidential  
  12
candidates.
10 By contrast, decentralized recruitment and low barriers to independent candidacies 
may encourage the appearance of candidates known as freewheeling independents. These 
candidates have no long-term identification with a party and typically use parties as mere 
electoral vehicles to reach the presidency. As a consequence, elected presidents will be less 
constrained by party ties, but they may be unable to build legislative coalitions (Morgenstern and 
Siavelis, 2004). In this case, policies could become more unstable (because the policies pursued 
by the president are the president’s own and do not follow a historic party stance) and less 
adaptable (because it will be harder—usually more costly—to respond to shocks).  
The incentives behind some of the actions of the president may also be explained by the 
tenure of the presidency, given term limits and reelection constraints, because they explain 
their decision-making horizon.  If presidents can serve consecutive terms and there is the 
possibility that presidents can be reelected, the policies pursued by the president will usually be 
influenced by the reelection campaign.  If there is no possibility of reelection, the policies 
presidents will try to enact will be a mixture of trying to help the candidate of the party (mainly 
if former presidents tend to keep some role in party politics) and trying to influence the set of 
policies that the next president will have at his or her disposal (Carey, 2003).
11  Therefore, a 
candidate’s potential post-tenure career path could be very important in defining the policies he 
or she pursues while in office. 
 
Cabinets   
 
The cabinet—even if it is not always an initiator of policies (which it is in many countries)—is 
usually a major player for the attainment of the government objectives because it is in charge of 
the actual implementation. Additionally, cabinets usually serve as a mechanism to cement 
coalitions. Given certain constitutional mandates that regulate the formation of the cabinet —
which are usually determined by the type of political regime—the electoral system and the party 
system could have an impact on the number of ministers, the issues under their domain, the way 
in which they are appointed, their capacity for coordination, their responsibilities, and their 
political allegiance.  More importantly, the electoral system and the party system could affect the 
duration of the ministers, their level of specialization and skills for the task at hand, and their 
                                                           
10 Party insiders are candidates who emerge from long-standing, institutionalized, and programmatic parties, and 
who have held positions in the party before becoming candidates.  
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mobility (Blondel, 1985). Among the characteristics of cabinets relevant for policymaking, two 
are the most salient: the process of cabinet formation and the stability of cabinets (Martínez 
Gallardo, 2005).  
The process of cabinet formation affects the identity of the cabinet and the allegiance of 
its members to the president. The decisions on who to name to those (sometimes) key positions 
depend in part on the electoral system for the presidency. Electoral systems that ensure a 
majority for the president’s party do not generate the need for the formation of coalitions and 
will usually result in compact cabinets (that is, cabinets made up entirely of members from the 
president’s party).
12 On the other hand, when coalitions are needed, they can be cemented 
through positions in the cabinet, generating multiparty cabinets. The formation of the cabinet 
becomes more relevant the weaker the partisan powers of the president, or the more fragmented 
the party system. For example, in the case of Bolivia, there is a strong correlation among the 
number of ministries, the number of cabinet positions offered to coalition members, and the 
share of the votes obtained by the president in the general election (IDB, 2005). 
In cases of government coalitions, the degree of cabinet coalescence (that is, the extent 
that cabinet posts reflect the distribution of seats held by the parties joining the executive in the 
legislature) may affect legislative voting behavior, and thus the ability of the president to pass his 
agenda. For example, Amorim Neto (2002) finds that cabinets in Brazil that display a high 
correspondence between cabinet portfolios and legislative seats held by the parties joining the 
executive foster coalition discipline, as they generate incentives for the parties to support 
executive initiatives in the legislature. While President Cardozo’s cabinet maintained that 
correspondence, President Lula’s cabinet was more partisan. According to Pereira and Power 
(2005), this is one of the reasons why his government had to cement the coalition through other 
means in congress.   
Cabinet stability affects the stability and efficiency of policymaking, and thus of public 
policies.
13 One source of cabinet instability is frequent changes in government.  In Latin 
America, it is common for each incoming president to change not only the people in charge of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
11 Offering past presidents a position in the party could be a mechanism for aligning their incentives when leaving 
office with those of the party.  
12 A compact cabinet would have fewer conflicts over policy.  For example, Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006) find that 
the fewer the number of parties in the government coalition, the lower are public expenditures.  
13 For example, Amorim Neto and Borsani (2004) find that cabinet stability (low ministerial turnover) is conducive 
to fiscal policy stability: that is, the ability to control spending and attain fiscal balance.    
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the ministries but also the overall structure of government by creating new ministries, 
eliminating others, changing their names, functions, and scope, and the like.
14 High cabinet 
instability ultimately leads to high policy instability, low accumulation of expertise, and thus low 
quality and less adaptable policies. When rotation is high, ministers have no time and incentives 





The type of political regime, the degree of power of the president, and the method of election and 
selection can affect the number of agents with influence on policymaking, their stability (and 
discount rate factor), the availability of enforcement mechanisms, and the arenas where 
transaction take place. As the degree of power of the president increases, the government’s 
capacity to generate changes and new policies tends to increase as well. For example, in strong 
presidential systems, the president can try to force policies unilaterally through executive decrees 
in cases of a divided legislature. Alternatively, if she cannot circumvent passing its proposal 
through the legislature, the president may use her appointment prerogatives and other incentive 
mechanisms to cement coalitions in the legislature. As a rule of thumb, transactions generally 
take place in the legislature in weak presidential systems, while they take place in less formal 
environments in strong presidential systems.
15 In Argentina, a country with a strong presidential 
system, most of the decisions are not taken through Congress but in other less institutionalized 
arenas, like short-term agreements between the president and the governors, reinforcing the 
volatility of policies and the distortionary mechanisms utilized to attempt to “insulate” policies 
given the low enforcement of intertemporal political compromises (Spiller and Tommasi, 2003). 
In Brazil, the president is able to pass her agenda though the legislature because she has at her 
disposal relatively cheap tokens of exchange: the discretionary execution of legislative budget 
amendments (Alston et al., 2006). 
                                                           
14 In Latin America, it is common to see “failed innovations”: ministries that are created and abolished a few years 
later (Blondel, 1982).  
15 According to Mainwaring and Shugart (1997), presidential regimes in which the chief executive is endowed with 
limited legislative powers and in which the party system is compact generate stronger incentives for inter-branch 
cooperation than regimes that grant extensive legislative prerogatives to the president and feature a dispersed party 
system.  
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Table 2 summarizes some of the relationships presented in this section regarding 
executive branch political institutions and the features of cooperation, and some readily available 
related measures. For example, the tenure of executive branch officials, reelection constraints, 
and the existence of censure or impeachment mechanisms available to the legislature affect the 
time horizon of the chief executive ex ante. Ex post, actual reelection rates and measures of 
government stability help to explain the incentives of government officials while in office. 
Hence, they are another piece of evidence for understanding the policymaking process and the 
features of public policies. 
 
2. Legislative Branch 
 
Two roles have traditionally been conferred to the legislature: to legislate, and to restrain the 
executive branch. In terms of the framework of this study, the legislature, since its inception, has 
been considered an institution that would help reduce the volatility of polices and better represent 
the preferences of the populace.  The legislature’s effectiveness in doing so depends on the 
institutions of the executive just described and on the institutions of the legislature.  Legislative 
institutions (broadly defined) can have important consequences for how policies are decided and 
implemented and the possibility of engaging in intertemporal cooperation. In terms of the 
approach followed in this document, those institutions could have an impact on the number of 
relevant political actors and their relative duration (and discount factor), tilt the results of the 
policymaking process in favor of some geographic or demographic minority, affect the “quality” 
of the representatives, and affect the arenas where decisions are made, among other possibilities. 
Among the legislative institutions that could affect the behavior of legislators, this discussion 
highlights two factors: electoral rules, the rules of access to the legislature, such as the electoral 
rules and party nomination procedures; and legislative structure, the rules that organize the 
workings of the legislature, such as whether the legislature is divided in two chambers, and the 
roles and prerogatives of committees.
16  
     
 
 
                                                           
16 These two groups are interdependent because the rules and workings of congress tend to be an endogenous 
response to the impact of the electoral rules on party discipline and organization. The study of the inner workings of 
congress and its interactions with the executive and other actors is one of the main focuses in the country cases 




As is the case with the executive branch, the method of election of representatives is a very 
important determinant of the number of relevant policymakers and the incentives of 
policymakers.
17 One way the traditional literature has analyzed the impact of electoral rules on 
policymaking has been primarily through their impact on representativeness, effectiveness, and 
participation.
18 An electoral system that fosters these features would basically ensure that a 
strong connection exists between citizens and representatives, that citizens’ preferences are 
represented in the legislature according to their weight in society, and that legislators can work 
those preferences into policy effectively.   
The first characteristic of the method of election is whether representatives to congress 
are directly elected, indirectly elected, or appointed. These options influence the number of 
relevant players. Because representatives have as one of their main objectives maximizing the 
returns on their political careers, they will usually try to satisfy those constituencies that provide 
them with the greatest benefit. This choice can differ according to the method of election. For 
example, if representatives are appointed by the executive branch, they are usually not potential 
veto players for executive branch initiatives; this reduces the number of relevant actors. If 
representatives are selected by subnational legislatures (indirect election), they could become 
highly relevant players when dealing with some issues, such as intergovernmental transfers; this 
increases the number of players, at least with regard to these issues.  
In Latin America, indirect election and appointment have been gradually phased out in 
favor of direct election. While this reform alone could help to align the preferences of the 
representative with those of the citizenry, differences in the system used for the direct election of 
representatives play a role as well. The most common differences are those with respect to the 
                                                           
17 This discussion does not follow very strict criteria for classifying electoral systems. Using somewhat stricter 
criteria, Katz (1997) classifies electoral systems according to: translation of votes into seats (electoral formula and 
constituencies); nature of choice (object of choice, type and number of choices); access to the ballot box (suffrage, 
registration of voters, ease of voting); and control of candidacy (qualification and nomination, campaign activity, 
public subsidy).  
18 An electoral system that is optimally representative is one in which political groups obtain legislative seats in 
nearly exact proportion to their share of the vote.  An electoral system fosters effectiveness if it produces sufficient 
concentration of power in the legislature to make it possible for diverse societal preferences to be aggregated and 
resolved into acts of government (Payne et al., 2002).  Finally, participation refers to how the form of voting affects 
the strength of the connection between the constituent and his or her representative. This is also called the agency 
dimension, and it could affect voter turnout (Grofman and Reynolds, 2001).  
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electoral formula, the ballot structure, and/or the magnitude of electoral districts.
19  In some 
countries, each district is represented by a single legislator (single-member districts); in other 
countries, each district is represented by several legislators (multimember districts).  In single-
member districts, the seat is allocated to the candidate who had the largest number of votes 
(either in the first ballot or after a runoff election). In the case of multimember districts, 
candidates are usually part of a party list, and seats are allocated according to one of a variety of 
different formulas that relate the percentage of votes that the candidates or group of candidates 
received in the election to the percentage of seats.  Ideally, the list of candidates that receive a 
given share of votes would receive the same share of seats. However, the electoral formula plus 
the district size (how many legislators are elected from each district) and the thresholds of 
representation (the minimum percentage of votes that a party must reach to win representation) 
could introduce a wedge between the share of votes and the share of seats, increasing the degree 
of disproportionality and thus affecting the degree of influence of different actors in society.
20 
Electoral rules, particularly district magnitude, could also affect whether those who try to 
enter the legislature do so through an existing party or a new party (because of strategic voting).
21 
Effectively, the number of effective parties (and potential players) is usually higher as the system 
becomes more proportional. In Latin America, the effective number of parties is close to two in 
Chile (with a district size of two) and almost eight in Brazil, where the average district is close to 
twenty (IDB, 2005).
22  The relationship between the number of parties and the number of 
                                                           
19 The electoral formula is the method by which vote totals are translated into claims upon seats. The main classes of 
electoral formula in democracies are plurality rule and proportional representation. The ballot structure consists of 
the number of votes each voter is entitled to cast; whether voters are allowed to abstain from using some of their 
votes, when they have more than one, or must cast them all; and whether voters can cumulate their votes or not.  
Finally, the magnitude of the electoral district refers to the number of seats to be filled by the voters of that district. 
20 The disproportionality for each party in a particular election is simply the difference between its vote share and its 
seat share.  Disproportionality is usually larger in countries that use majority or plurality voting than in countries that 
use proportional representation systems.  Among those that elect their legislators using proportionality, 
disproportionality would be larger the smaller the size of the district; the higher the threshold of representation; and 
if countries have presidential systems with concurrent elections. 
21 Strategic voting refers to a type of behavior induced by certain electoral rules in which voters choose not to vote 
their first-order candidates, in order to prevent the least preferred candidates from winning (Shepsle and Bonchek 
,1997).  
22 The degree of fragmentation of a legislature is usually measured one of two ways: through Rae’s fragmentation 
index (Rae, 1967), which indicates the probability that two randomly chosen legislators would belong to a different 
party; or through the effective number of parties (Laakso and Taagapera, 1979).  The major advantage of the 
effective number of parties is that it can be visualized more easily than the Rae index (it approximates the equivalent 
number of parties of equal size for a given fractionalization).  
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relevant players in the legislature depends on the degree of allegiance of candidates to parties.
23 
If party discipline is high, the number of effective political parties would proxy the number of 
agents with power over decision-making in the chamber. Party discipline is also affected by the 
electoral system because it shapes the incentives of those who must compete, particularly 
regarding their allegiance to the party bosses or to the constituency that elects them. Under a 
regime of multimember districts (large size districts) and proportional representation, party 
leaders have a higher number of “carrots and sticks” (particularly under closed lists); thus 
politicians respond to the party leadership’s platform to increase their chances of nomination 
(Gallagher, Laver, and Mair, 1992).
24 Under a regime of single-member districts and plurality 
rule (and to a lesser extent under proportional representation with small district size), politicians 
can usually act as political entrepreneurs who respond mostly to their local constituency to 
secure nomination and reelection.   
In addition to the size of the district, in the case of multimember districts, another 
important consideration is whether legislators are elected from closed or open lists  (ballot 
structure). The ballot structure has important implications, as it could affect electoral strategies, 
the degree of party discipline, and the link between voters and representatives (Carey and 
Shugart, 1995). Assuming that party labels are meaningful, closed list systems provide party 
leaders the greatest control over rank and file legislators, encouraging party discipline 
(Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997). As party leaders decide the order of the list, this may also 
weaken the nexus between legislators and voters. 
By contrast, in open list systems, as candidates of the same party compete against one 
another, they face incentives to form factions: that is, organized groups within parties that 
compete for control of valued resources (Cox and McCubbins 2001). To sum up, while closed 
list system encourage party votes, in open list systems legislators face incentives to cultivate 
personal votes (Ames 1995b).
25 
                                                           
23 One way to look at the incentives of candidates to conform to citizens or to their party is by looking at the degree 
of particularism: that is, the incentives to cultivate a personal or individual vote versus a party or collective vote (see 
Carey and Shugart, 1995; Gaviria et al., 2003; Johnson and Wallack, 2006). 
24 Rasch (1999) considers that holding equal other institutions, electoral systems have an impact on party discipline 
through three different channels: district magnitude, ballot, and decision rules or electoral formulas.  Basically, 
parties represented in the legislature would be more disciplined if there is a large average number of seats per 
district, if the placement on party lists is centrally controlled or is controlled by the party branch of large regions, 
and if formulas are more proportional (there is a low threshold for election).   
25 A word of caution: the link between legislators and voters in open list systems should not be overestimated. In 
large multimember districts, as individual legislators are encouraged to focus on narrow constituencies, it is more  
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The overall degree of fractionalization of the legislature also depends on the incentives 
for coalition formation and stability generated by the electoral rules. Usually, coalitions will 
form in the pre-electoral stage in single-member districts, while coalitions will form in the post-
electoral stage in multimember districts. However, there is much variation within the 
multimember district family, as some systems may encourage coalition formation at the pre-
electoral stage as well. The binomial system used in Chile is a case in point.
26  
The binomial system provides parties a strong incentive to coalesce at the district level, 
as doubling the rival’s vote share gives the winning list all seats, or securing a second place and 
avoiding being doubled gives the list half the seats. Additionally, given that the costs of 
defection for a party (such as leaving the coalition) are high, the binomial system also fosters 
coalition stability (Aninat et al. 2006). The binomial system seems to be one of the main 
characteristics that explains some of the good features of public policy in Chile.  
In contrast, multimember systems, where the thresholds of success are lower, make 
parties compete unilaterally, thus limiting their ability to form coalitions at the pre-electoral 
stage. The country evidence shows that the stability of coalitions varies across countries and 
across administrations; it depends at least in part on the extent to which there is a match between 
what the president is able to offer legislators to keep them within the coalition, and what 
legislators want. In the case of Ecuador, agreements are short-lived because legislators do not 
want to be associated with the president. In the case of Brazil, presidents use the distribution of 
projects with local benefits to gather political support (Stein et al., 2007).  
Electoral rules also play a role in explaining the representation of ideologies and the 
polarization of the political system. Thus they also affect legislators’ preferences. The electoral 
system can affect representation of ideologies, minority representation, and representation of 
local interests (localism), and whether politicians could compete successfully at the local or the 
national level (Grofman and Reynolds, 2001) through their impact on barriers to entry and 
representation biases. While some electoral systems favor the entry of small parties, others 
require a large presence in the electorate in order to win representation (high thresholds). 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
costly for voters to become informed about the contending candidates, and thus it may be more difficult to hold 
them accountable (Payne et al., 2002).  
26 The binomial system is a proportional representation system with district magnitude of 2 in all districts. Each of 
the lists receiving the two highest vote shares wins one of the two available seats per district— unless the most voted 
list outplaces its second place rival by a ratio of more than two to one, in which case both seats go to the most voted  
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Similarly, some electoral systems could overrepresent some parties and underrepresent others 
according to the distribution of their supporters across districts (Saiz and Geser, 1999; John and 
Saiz, 1999; Calvo and Murillo, 2004) and the degree of malapportionment  (Samuels and 
Snyder, 2001; Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Ting, 2002). Malapportionment refers to an inequitable 
or unsuitable apportioning of representatives to a legislative body.  The idea is that some districts 
could be electing more than an equal share of legislators according to the population of the 
district, violating the concept of one person one vote, or more specifically, the same number of 
representatives per voter. Even if malapportionment does not affect the number of relevant 
players, it could affect their identity, and hence, the results of the policy making process. Given 
the strong relationship between malapportionment and federalism, its effects are further analyzed 
in that section. 
Additionally, electoral systems can affect the polarization of the political system 
(Sartori, 1976; Mainwaring and Scully, 1995). Electoral systems affect polarization through 
electoral formulas and district magnitudes. In single-member district (SMD) electoral systems, 
policies are hardly ideological and a successful politician responds to the preferences of the 
median voter in his or her geographic district. By contrast, in regimes of multimember districts 
and proportional representation, parties are more ideologically oriented than in two-party 
systems and political parties’ preferred policies usually deviate from that of the median voter. A 
higher degree of polarization could imply the existence of more extreme positions in 
government, the legislature, or the political spectrum.  In some instances, this could lead to 
greater instability in the political system and more drastic changes in policies (Haggard, 2000).  
Some of the actions of legislators are explained by their expected duration, which affects 
the rate at which they discount the future (discount rate). Higher discount rates reduce the value 
of future benefits and reduce legislators’ incentives to invest in their capabilities while in office. 
The duration is determined, among other factors, by term limits, reelection constraints, and the 
electoral system in place. The implications of the first two factors for duration are 
straightforward; the shorter the term and the harder it is to be reelected, the higher the discount 
rate. The electoral system affects duration through its impact on determining who has the power 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
list. In addition, coalitions are allowed only to the extent that they are national in scope (thus they are binding in 
every district in the country).  
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to reward or punish legislators, that is, who is the legislator’s principal.
27  In single-member 
districts such as those in United States, it is the voters who are responsible for getting legislators 
reelected. Since seniority plays an important role in committee assignments, which in turn affect 
the ability of legislators to deliver benefits to their constituents, as a general rule voters have an 
incentive to reelect incumbent legislators. In contrast, in a country like Argentina where the 
direct connection between voters and legislators is weaker, governors and other provincial party 
leaders tend to be responsible for putting together party lists. They tend to be the “principals” of 
the legislators, and often have incentives to move legislators to other (often subnational) 
positions, which results in increased turnover in Congress.  
Some partial data support this hypothesis.  The high rate of reelection of members of the 
U.S. Congress is not that common in Latin America legislatures.  In Argentina, the number of 
incumbents running for reelection is close to 25 percent, and the reelection rate is below 20 
percent (Jones et al., 2002).  In Chile, however, around three-quarters of incumbents have been 
renominated for the legislature within the same coalition, and three-fifths have won reelection 
(Carey, 2002a).   In the mid-1980s, the percentage of representatives seeking reelection in 
Argentina was as low as 26 percent, compared to 99 percent in the United States.  For the same 
elections, the percentage of representatives returning to office was 17 percent in Argentina 
(proportional representation, closed lists) and 83 percent in the United States (plurality).  These 
percentages were 70 and 43 in Brazil (proportional representation, open list), and 76 and 59 in 
Chile, which has a binomial system, (Morgenstern, 2002; IDB, 2005). 
A potential (albeit minor) institution that could also affect the reelection rate of 
legislators is the power to redraw district lines (gerrymandering), so as to change the balance of 
power and representation of parties, and hence, the ability of legislators to be reelected. If 
gerrymandering is common and there are few restrictions on how to redraw districts, even the 
most popular legislators could be ousted from power by redistricting by the opposition party. For 
example, in the United States, the single-member constituencies for the lower chamber are drawn 
(and redrawn) by the state legislatures to maintain a similar ratio of representation across 
constituencies and in order to take into account the representation of minorities. This redrawing 
                                                           
27 The principal-agent problem is a particular description of a situation under game theory. There is a player called a 
principal, and one or more other players called agents with utility functions that are in some sense different from the 
principal's. The principal can act more effectively through the agents than directly, and must construct incentive 
schemes to get them to behave at least in part according to the principal's interests  
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gives state legislatures the ability to influence the results of upcoming elections. Even though 
there are certain procedures they have to follow (in order for the new constituencies to stand up 
in court), history provides very interesting examples of manipulation (Crain, 2003).  There is no 
available evidence for the world at large, but the evidence for the United States indicates that 
when the Democrats controlled redistricting, they protected Democratic seats in the lower house 
of the legislature following redistricting, and the opposite held when Republicans controlled 
redistricting (Besley and Case, 2003). Consequently, gerrymandering could have an effect on the 
game of political transactions because it could affect the stability of legislators and their political 
allegiance.  
As shown, the method of election, along with other complementary institutions, is 
relevant in this framework because it could have important implications for the number, 
characteristics, preferences, and stability of agents and groups that are in charge of 
policymaking.
28 Additionally, the electoral system could affect the pool of candidates willing to 
enter politics and the personal characteristics of individual legislators (such as their competence 
and honesty) because different electoral systems affect the incentives faced by individual 
legislators to extract rents or engage in corrupt activities (Caselli and Morelli 2004).
29 According 
to standard criteria by which legislatures are compared, Chile’s congress is reestablishing itself 
as an unusually professional and technically competent legislature.  The same cannot be said of 
other legislative bodies in the region, where professional capacity is not common and politicians 
rotate without accumulating any institutional knowledge (Carey, 2002; Saiegh, 2005; IDB, 2005) 
 
Legislative Structure: Unicameralism and Bicameralism 
 
One of the most important characteristics regarding the structure of legislatures is whether they 
have a single chamber or are divided into two different chambers.  In Latin America, more than 
half the countries have bicameral legislatures (Llanos and Nolte, 2003; Sánchez, Nolte, and 
                                                           
28 In addition to the electoral system, other determinants that could affect the personal characteristics (competence, 
honesty) of legislators are candidacy requirements, nomination procedures, term limits, and party organization. 
Additionally, gender and ethnic constraints could affect entry into politics. 
29 First, while in proportional representation (PR) systems incumbent party leaders monopolize control over rents, in 
plurality systems the locus of rents is more evenly divided between the party leadership and individual legislators. 
Second, the ability of voters and opposition parties to control rent extraction under both systems is different. As 
plurality rule produces districts with a smaller number of voters than proportional representation systems, collective 
action problems for voters and opposition groups in monitoring corrupt incumbents are less severe. Thus some 
authors argue that proportional representation systems are more susceptible to corruption relative to plurality 
systems (Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman 2002).  
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Llanos, 2005). Nonetheless, there is little agreement in the literature on the benefits of having a 
bicameral legislature. While political philosophers like Charles Montesquieu were in favor of the 
institution, others like Jeremy Bentham were not. Some of the advantages of having a bicameral 
legislature include the following:  avoiding bad decisions made in haste;
30 avoiding actions that 
favor narrow interests (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962); reducing the likelihood of voting cycles 
(Mueller, 1996a); and representing different interests (Mueller, 1996b).
31 Of course, the validity 
of these arguments depends on the implementation of the system. In some cases, bicameralism 
could make the government incapable of responding decisively to a crisis, could increase 
wasteful redistribution (either to a geographic or to a corporate constituency), or could 
excessively increase the cost of reaching a decision (Mueller, 1996b). In other cases, having a 
second chamber could provide the necessary balance of power. Because the strategies of the 
actors and the outcomes are affected by the presence or absence of a second chamber, the study 
of the policymaking process in countries with bicameral legislatures must focus not only on the 
bargaining of each one of the chambers separately, but on the interaction between chambers as 
well. 
Two institutions related to the legislature determine each chamber’s strength or 
weakness, its relevance, and the basis of its representation. The first important aspect is the 
constitutional powers of each chamber (such as the order of voting, rules to overturn/modify 
decisions, and each chamber’s role in the confirmation/impeachment processes). Those powers 
determine the role of each chamber in the policymaking process, which one has the most power, 
and under which conditions both are relevant policy players. Constitutional powers could 
determine that in certain countries or policy areas both chambers are relevant, which would make 
it more difficult to pass new legislation. In other countries (or policy areas) one of the chambers 
could be “subservient” to the other and would not act as an additional veto player. 
The second important feature is the method of election. While this document has already 
discussed the impact of this feature on the role of the legislature as a whole, here the emphasis is 
on the differential impact on a second chamber.  On the one hand, the method of election could 
affect its political clout. For example, a second chamber that is not directly elected could lack the 
                                                           
30 This was one of the reasons James Madison, John Jay, and Alexander Hamilton (1787) mentioned in The 
Federalist Papers.   
31 Of course, this begs the question of which interests those may be.     
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democratic legitimacy, and thus the real political influence, that popular election confers.
32  On 
the other hand, the electoral rules may affect whether having two chambers adds players and 
interests to the bargaining, which interests those are, and thus the type of negotiation that ensues.  
The method of selecting the representatives to each chamber and the basis of 
representation (type of constituency) determine the degree of congruence between the upper and 
lower houses in bicameral legislatures. If there is congruence, and the party composition of one 
chamber mimics the composition of the other, it is often assumed that preferences of the 
chambers will be similar or identical.  However, congruence (and similarity) should not be 
equated with identity of positions. Legislators in each chamber could be representing different 
constituencies, as some geographic entities could be overrepresented in one of the chambers. 
Moreover, chambers could have different decision-making rules. In addition, opinions may vary 
even within the party. 
One factor that can explain the divergence of positions across chambers is the degree of 
the legislature’s malapportionment. Usually, the second chamber is elected by methods 
designed so as to overrepresent certain minorities. The greatest degree of overrepresentation 
occurs when there is equality of state representation regardless of state population, as is usually 
the case in the upper chamber of federal governments.
33 A high degree of overrepresentation 
(malapportionment) usually produces two effects. First, state-level interests are favored in public 
policy, particularly on fiscal policy. Second, smaller states usually end up relatively better off. 
For example, the Brazilian and Argentinean congresses overrepresent the (mostly poor) less 
populated states, and this overrepresentation affects policy outcomes (Samuels, 2003; Gibson 
and Calvo, 2000). 
Therefore, even under congruence, the analysis indicates that compared with 
unicameralism, bicameralism could increase the number of relevant players and thus make 
changes to the status quo more difficult (Tsebelis and Money, 1997). If changes occur, they 
happen through a process of both cooperation and conflict between the two chambers. The 
outcome of the bargaining between the chambers depends on the relative power of each house, 
which is a function of the constitutional powers and institutional rules (such as the chamber in 
                                                           
32 Currently in Latin America, there are no cases of indirect election. In Chile, until the constitutional reform of 
2005, nine senators were appointed and one seat was reserved for former presidents. 
33 Numerous explanations for this arrangement have been offered: both normative explanations (in terms of equity) 
and positive explanations (such as who held the power at the moment of drafting the constitutions).   
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which bills are introduced, which chamber has the last word on disputes, and the number of 
possible iterations for considering a bill) and the impatience of each chamber to reach a deal. We 
now turn to those factors. 
 
Legislative Organization: Committees and Agenda-Setting Power 
 
In a context where the legislature has an impact on policymaking, analysis of the practices and 
regulations that rule legislative activities matters because these practices and regulations may 
alter the number of players and their allegiance. By distributing power and resources, voting 
rules, agenda-setting powers, rules for introducing bills, order of voting, presence or absence of 
roll call votes, and the relevance of committees and seniority all affect the actual number of 
agents that have influence over policy decisions, their incentives, the arenas in which they 
interact, and their discount rates. The legislature rules are usually endogenous because 
politicians—mainly party leaders—react to the deeper institutions commonly found in the 
constitutions, such as the electoral rules, by trying to shape the workings of the political 
institutions to their advantage (Shepsle and Weingast, 1987; Carey, 2006; Cox, 2006).   
One important aspect of legislative organization is the rules that guide the process and 
structure of legislation. Agenda-setting power refers to any special ability given to legislators to 
determine which bills are considered on the floor and under what procedures.
34 Because 
legislative rights and resources are not evenly distributed among legislators, agenda-setting 
power affects the structure of the policymaking process and the weight of legislators in policy 
decisions (Cheibub and Limongi, 2002). Understanding agenda-setting power is thus 
fundamental to fully grasping the micro workings of legislatures.
35 First, it provides clues about 
the distribution of “power” in legislatures. Second, it offers insights on the way majority parties 
or coalitions control the flow of legislation and thus influence legislative outcomes (Cox and 
McCubbins, 2005).
36 For example, in some countries, the president of the chamber controls 
which bills will be considered in a legislative year. Those prerogatives increase his or her power, 
                                                           
34 Agenda power is positive/negative when a legislator or party has the ability to ensure/prevent the consideration of 
bills on the floor. 
35 Cox and McCubbins (2005) explain the workings of the U.S. Congress by analyzing agenda-setting rules. For 
applications of the agenda power framework in other institutional settings, see Figuereido and Limongi (2000); 
Amorim Neto, Cox, and McCubbins (2003); and Jones and Hwang (2005). Tsebelis (2002) also analyzes agenda-
setting in parliamentary systems. 
36 Agenda-setting rules can usually be found in a legislature’s formal procedures (“reglamentos”). Alemán (2006) 
provides a survey of the internal rules of procedure in Latin American legislatures.  
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which s/he can use to foster discipline of fellow party legislators and strike deals with the 
opposition. 
The second aspect to analyze is the role of committees. Committee power depends on 
the rules governing the sequence of proposing, amending, and in some cases vetoing proposed 
bills in the legislative process. In most countries, committees are gatekeepers in their respective 
policy domains and repositories of policy expertise. In addition, they are the point of origin of 
policies, and they exercise disproportionate control over the agenda in their policy domains. 
Therefore, committees are sometimes powerful, and they are able to impose many of their policy 
preferences (Weingast and Marshall, 1988; Shepsle and Bonchek, 1997).  
However, the extent of committee strength, the degree of specialization, and the technical 
capacities of committees vary widely and are shaped by a number of factors (Saiegh, 2005). 
First, committee rules determine the number and size of committees, thus affecting the supply of 
committee slots. If the number of committees per legislator is large, legislators are required to 
serve on several committees at the same time. As time and effort are limited resources, and 
legislators participate in more committees simultaneously, the level of specialization and the 
degree to which legislators accumulate policy expertise decreases (Jones et al., 2002). Second, 
the process of committee and leadership assignment also affects specialization. While a seniority 
system in which legislators serve particular sectoral constituencies in order to be reelected fosters 
specialization, a partisan distribution of committee and leadership assignments, where party 
leaders practice rotating legislators from one committee to the other, undermines specialization. 
A final factor shaping a committee system’s technical capacities is the possession of resources, 
such as a competent committee staff (Saiegh, 2005).    
In those cases where committees are important for legislative policymaking, if party 
leaders retain control of committee nominations,
37 they could use those nominations to ensure a 
higher degree of party discipline (Cox and McCubbins, 1994). Thus committees have gained 
importance in countries like the United States, where party leaders and party seniority determine 
access to committee membership (Shepsle and Weingast, 1987; Rasch, 1999). In the case of 
                                                           
37  There are other ways in which party leaders can increase party discipline, such as the allocation of party funds for 
the electoral campaigns of individual legislators or party nomination procedures.  Opposition status also fosters 
party discipline, despite the fact that the opposition’s party leadership controls fewer resources and is thus more 
vulnerable.  Additionally, when there is an opposition party that is willing to block most government initiatives, the 
discipline in the governing party tends to increase. Members of governing parties in presidential systems tend to feel  
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Colombia (before a recent reform), the party label was not a relevant indicator of allegiance and 
factionalization was very high. Even campaign financing would flow directly to the factions, out 
of the control of party leaders. In that context, the only tool party leaders had for retaining some 
power over the legislators was through the selection of legislators for committees (which are few 
and important). 
Even though party leaders have usually tried to find ways to increase the importance of 
committees in order to increase their clout with the rank and file of their parties, in some 
countries they have chosen the opposite path to overcome problematic situations within their 
parties. For example, parties have chosen to create new positions and new offices within the 
parties and to increase the number of positions in the legislature, including increases in the 
number of committees. In Argentina, leaders use assignments to generate support, both within 
and among parties, and since reelection rates are low, the number of committee posts has grown 
to provide leaders more posts to offer to pliant legislators. The number of committees grew from 
26 in the 1983–85 legislature to 39 in the 1993–95 legislature (Jones, 2002; Jones et al., 2002; 
Mustapic, 2002).
  All of this has tended to conspire against the role of committees as repositories 
of technical expertise and policymaking capabilities (Jones et al., 2006). In contrast, in 
Colombia, legislators can participate in only one committee for the entire four-year term. These 
features provide high incumbency rates and a high level of specialization.  
Party leaders are not the only ones who use committees to their advantage. Legislators 
usually choose to belong to those committees that would ensure the highest chance of reelection. 
Stratmann and Baur (2002) find empirical evidence of different behaviors across legislators for 
Germany, where half of the parliamentary seats are awarded from single-member constituencies 
and the other half through proportional voting. The legislators elected from single-member 
constituencies, regardless of individual expertise, tend to choose those legislative committees 
that deal with geographically based affairs, while the legislators elected by party lists tend to 
prefer those committees that deal with broad-based policies and transfers. 
Finally, regarding the arenas where transactions take place, an important characteristic of 
Latin American legislative institutions is that much negotiation and bargaining occurs behind 
closed doors (Morgenstern, 2002). In most instances, presidents would prefer to shield 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
freer to vote against the executive on the assembly’s floor than their counterparts in parliamentary systems.  For 
details on party discipline in Europe, see Gallagher, Laver, and Mair (1992) and Sánchez de Dios (1999).  
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disagreements with the legislature, as well as the concessions made to the legislature (or to 
individual legislators), from the public eye. In other cases, when the president’s proposal enjoys 
strong popular support, a president may prefer to override any legislative proposal by relying on 
public opinion and refusing to offer concessions.  
 
The Role of the Legislature in the PMP and Congress’ Capabilities 
Recent studies have developed classifications or typologies of Latin American legislatures on the 
basis of variables and concepts like those emphasized above. By focusing on Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, and Mexico, Cox and Morgenstern (2001, 2002) classify Latin America legislatures as 
reactive instead of proactive.  This implies that while the legislatures rarely initiate legislation, 
they are often involved in negotiating over policy issues behind the scenes and vetoing or 
amending executive initiatives. Accordingly, Latin American legislatures are not necessarily 
powerless or unimportant, and presidents must anticipate what those legislatures may accept and 
modify their strategies accordingly.  The support for the presidents in the legislature varies 
greatly in Latin America, making it more difficult to establish a pattern of relationship between 
the two branches over time.  While support for the president usually oscillates around half of the 
members of the legislature in the United States, in Latin America the amplitude is larger. 
IDB (2005), drawing on Saiegh (2005) and Stein and Tommasi (2005b), develops an 
index of the policymaking capabilities of congresses. The index attempts to capture the factors 
that shape the role of legislatures in the policymaking process by focusing on the capabilities of 
congress as an organization, as well as on some personal characteristics of legislators. The 
quantitative and subjective variables that make up the index include: the level of confidence of 
citizens and business in the performance of congress, the average years of legislator experience, 
the percentage of legislators with university education, their technical expertise, the average 
number of committee memberships per legislator, the strength of committees, and the extent to 
which congress is a desirable place for politicians to build a career. The evidence indicates that 
those countries with high levels of congressional capabilities tend to score high on the features of 
their public policies.  
Table 3 summarizes the main relationships between political institutions and the 
determinants of cooperation at the legislative level. As presented in this section, higher 
fractionalization of the legislature will usually increase the number of actors involved in policy  
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decisions. Of course, this is not independent of the degree of party discipline, the role of 
committees and agenda setting, and the ability of the parties to cement coalitions. Similarly, the 
impact of having a second chamber depends greatly on the degree of congruence of preferences 
with the lower chamber and on the prerogatives of each one of the chambers.  While under a 
certain configuration of institutions a second chamber may reduce the legislature’s ability to  
enter long-term exchanges, in others it could provide the incentives (and enforcement 
mechanisms) that could help to reach cooperative outcomes. 
As a final caveat, an important characteristic of Latin American legislative institutions is 
that the workings of legislatures are usually difficult to ascertain from objective data because 
much negotiation and bargaining occurs behind closed doors (Morgenstern, 2002).  In most 
instances, presidents would prefer to shield disagreements with the legislature from the public 
eye, as well as concessions made to the legislatures. In other cases, when the president’s proposal 
enjoys strong popular support, a president may prefer to override any legislative proposal by 
relying on public opinion and refusing to offer concessions. This is a very important 
characteristic of most legislatures in Latin America and one that should be examined by country-
specific analysis.   
The impact of congress on policymaking is not independent of the role of the judiciary. 
The evidence seems to indicate that congressional capabilities particularly affect policies in the 
case of judicial independence; otherwise, there would be no regular enforcement of the acts of 
congress. 
 
4. Judiciary Branch 
 
The role of the judiciary is framed by the choice of judicial system: that is, whether a country 
“chooses” to adopt civil law or common law. Common law is the body of customary law, based 
upon judicial decisions and embodied in reports of decided cases, that has been administered by 
the courts of England since the Middle Ages and has evolved into the type of legal system now 
found also in the United States and in most of the member states of the Commonwealth. Civil 
law, which has been adopted in much of Latin America, is a set of codes that sets forth general 
rules that are applied and interpreted taking into consideration the “spirit” of the code in an effort 
to apply to each case the solution that would have been desired by the legislator (Tullock, 1997).  
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This distinction is important, as it frames the relative importance of the judiciary branch vis-à-vis 
the other branches of government. 
In terms of the framework of analysis of this study, the judiciary may play several 
policymaking roles.
38 It can be an impartial referee, as an enforcer of political transactions 
among different political actors; this can increase the durability and stability of policies. The 
judiciary can also be a policy player, shaping policies according to its preferences and/or 
society’s, and sometimes providing a voice for marginalized or unorganized social sectors. The 
judiciary plays these roles through its reactive (veto) and proactive prerogatives. This distinction 
of the potential roles of the judiciary is important because it provides a more accurate depiction, 
moving beyond the analysis of its actions only as a veto player and highlighting its importance as 
enforcer of political transactions. These functions are not mutually exclusive, and some are 
closely connected. 
The relevance of the judiciary as an actor in the PMP depends on the degree of judicial 
independence.
39 If the judiciary is independent, legislators and the executive must take into 
account the preferences of the judiciary when making policy. On the contrary, if the judiciary 
responds to one of the other branches of government, then its actions would merely mimic (and 
probably strengthen) the actions of that branch of government.
  
Among the characteristics of the judiciary that affect judicial independence, several stand 
out: the extent of budgetary autonomy; the level of transparency and the extent of the use of 
meritocratic criteria in the process for nominating and appointing judges; the stability of the 
tenure of judges; and the reach of judicial review powers. Effective judicial independence also 
depends upon the behavior of other actors, such as whether the president or political parties 
regularly interfere with the courts. This, in turn, depends upon these actors’ incentives (Sousa, 
2005).
40   
Given judiciary independence, the judiciary, as an impartial referee, can play the role of 
enforcer of political transactions. This offers an additional layer of durability to politicians’ 
                                                           
38 The framework has been adapted from Sousa (2005). 
39 Judicial independence has four interrelated dimensions: substantive independence, or the power to make judicial 
decisions and exercise official duties subject to no other authority but the law; personal independence, or stability of 
tenure and freedom from intimidation or threats; collective independence, or judicial participation in the central 
administration of courts; and internal independence, or independence from judicial superiors and colleagues.  
40 A topic related to the independence and duration of the judiciary is the existence and stability of, and respect for, 
the constitution. Whether or not a country has a written constitution, consideration such as the size of the majorities  
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agreements by bounding them to their commitments. Thus, working mainly in reactive fashion, 
the judiciary can provide a “durability mechanism” that can increase the probability of reaching 
intertemporal agreements.
41 In this framework, related to the work first discussed by Landes and 
Posner (1975), the presence of an independent court generates intertemporal enforcement of the 
political agreements undertaken today, increasing the benefits of implementing policy 
exchanges.
42  In other words, an independent judiciary tends to resolve time inconsistency 
problems (that is, agreements made today have a higher discounted value because they are less 
likely to be changed in the future) because judges exhibit a pronounced tendency to resolve legal 
disputes and ambiguities in terms of the expressed intentions of the legislature that originally 
enacted the law. Therefore, an independent judiciary, even through vetoing new legislation, 
could be a facilitator of intertemporal agreements.  In this context, a longer duration of judges 
could contribute to increasing the adaptability and stability of policies (Iaryczower, Spiller, and 
Tommasi, 2002).   
As a policy player, the judiciary branch can act in a reactive way (as a veto player) or in 
a proactive manner, molding policies according to its preferences by “ruling from the bench” in 
common law countries, or in civil law countries by interpreting laws according to the 
constitution.
43 For example, in a context where the judiciary is independent and able to veto new 
legislation, if the legislature and the executive wish to move policies out of the status quo they 
would have to approve policies that are closer than the status quo to the preferences of the 
median judge (Shepsle and Bonchek, 1997). Additionally, judges (or constitutional courts, in the 
case of civil law countries) can introduce their preferences into policymaking by ruling on 
policies and new legislation if their preferences differ substantially from those of the other agents 
(Cox and McCubbins, 2001; Tsebelis, 2002).
44  In this role, the judiciary could contribute to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
required for amendment and the type of judicial review would all contribute to determining the durability of rules—
and in that sense, the importance of judiciary independence (Lijphart, 1999). 
41 By entering the bargaining with veto power similar to the rest of the agents, it could also facilitate cooperation by 
enforcing the transactions that facilitate long-term agreements (Crain, 2001). 
42 Crain and Tollison (1979) show that as judicial independence and/or the tenure of judges increases, there are 
fewer incentives to use other, stricter rules to prevent time inconsistency problems.  (In game theory and economics, 
time inconsistency is a situation in a dynamic game where a player’s best plan for some future period will not be 
optimal when that future period arrives.) Stricter rules reduce the possibility of cooperation because they increase 
the number of veto players. Accordingly, an independent and durable judiciary would tend to facilitate political 
transactions. 
43 The judiciary can become a policy player by interpreting the statutes, not only in terms of what the legislature 
wrote at a particular time but also in light of the entire legal precedent. 
44 That is, if they are not “absorbed,” in terms of the definition by  Tsebelis (2002).   
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making policies more public regarding and to ensuring that policies are more inclusive, if judges’ 
preferences are aligned with those of the population at large.    
  The preferences and quality of the judges, which affect which interests they represent, are 
usually determined by the appointment procedure and the rules by which the judiciary is 
organized.
45 To predict their preferences and potential effects on the policymaking process, it is 
important to understand who judges are and what they want.  Following the work of Posner 
(1994), some of the motivations for judges are popularity, prestige, and reputation: popularity 
among fellow judges; prestige in the legal and larger political community; and reputation in the 
academic legal world (for example, the desire not to be reversed by a higher court or the 
legislature). Therefore, in this context, the method of nomination and appointment (by the 
president, by the legislature, by both of them, by a judicial council, or by some other means) 
makes a difference. 
Summarizing, while the judiciary can constitute an additional veto player, making it 
harder for the government to change policies, or respond to crises, an independent judiciary can 
also favor the development of political transactions and move policies toward their (or society’s) 
bliss point.
46  On one hand, it can provide enforcement for the agreements reached by other 
actors. This can increase the durability of agreements and policies, and thus the present value of 
cooperation: in this case, increasing the adaptability and stability of policies.
47 On the other hand, 
by acting as a policy player, the judiciary can move policies toward increasing public 
regardedness, if its incentives are right. 
Table 4 presents a summary of the characteristics of the judiciary discussed in this section 
and some of the relevant measures that capture their importance for understanding the role of the 
judiciary in the PMP. For example, a meritocratic and autonomous judiciary (with ample review 
powers) will generally provide a higher enforcement of political deals, enabling transactions that 
would not take place otherwise. 
 
                                                           
45 Tsebelis (2002) discusses appointment procedures and impact on the preferences of the courts. Other factors that 
shape the judiciary’s independence are the degree of judicial budget autonomy, the terms and tenure of judges, and 
the extent of judicial review powers (Sousa, 2005). 
46 The bliss point is the point of maximum utility: the point that everyone wants to reach to maximize their utility 
according to their preferences.  
47 If there is no judicial independence and duration is low, actors would have to opt for other means to increase the 
durability of laws, such as introducing constitutional amendments and qualified majority rules.  If this were the case, 
policies would tend to be more rigid.  
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5. Federalism and Subnational Authorities 
 
The basis of federalism is a national polity with dual (or multiple) levels of government; each 
level exercises exclusive authority over constitutionally determined policy areas, but only one 
level of government—the central government—is internationally sovereign (Gibson, 2004). 
Federalism affects policymaking through the role that subnational authorities (governors) may 
play in the design and implementation of public policies and their interaction with national-level 
actors (presidents, legislators). For example, the introduction of subnational elections 
significantly changed political and party dynamics in Venezuela. The extent to which 
subnational authorities influence national policymaking depends on a number of institutional 
variables, to which the discussion now turns. 
The first important institutional variable is the method of selecting subnational 
authorities. If governors are popularly elected, they play a more important role than if they are 
appointed by the central government. If governors can be reelected, they have incentives to cater 
to their constituency and pursue regional goals at the expense of national objectives (Monaldi, 
2005). 
Another important institutional variable is the existence of a territorial chamber in the 
national congress, as discussed in the section on bicameralism. Most federal countries allow for 
the representation of territories (states, provinces) in the national policymaking process through 
senates. These chambers tend to increase the power of subnational political actors, as they 
provide an additional veto point in the political system. This means that subnational interests 
need to be taken into account when national actors design and bargain over policies.  
Another key factor is the overrepresentation of subnational units in the national legislature 
(malapportionment). Malapportionment strengthens the political power of the least populated 
states relative to the most populated units. Malapportionment is not a unique feature of territorial 
chambers. Several lower houses in federal systems show a certain degree of overrepresentation, 
even in population-based lower chambers.
48 As a consequence, overrepresented units may skew 
policies in their favor, and they typically receive higher resources per capita. This is the case in 
Argentina, which has the highest level of malapportionment in the upper chamber in Latin 
America and the third highest in the lower chamber (Samuels and Snyder, 2001). 
                                                           
48 This is a result of the existence of lower and upper limits to the number of deputies that a certain region may have, 
among other factors.  
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The method used for selecting candidates for the national legislature is important 
because it shapes the incentives of representatives once in office—and more generally, their 
political careers. If the candidates’ names and order are decided at the subnational level, the 
potential for regional party leaders to use their influence and resources to influence the election of 
legislators is high. In that case, the regional congressional delegation to the national legislature 
might vote more according to the governor’s line than to the national party leader’s or president’s 
line, giving another tool to the regions for influencing national politics. 
Moreover, when subnational authorities (such as governors) are important political 
players at the local level and parties are organized along territorial lines, national elections are 
heavily influenced by subnational-level politics, as governors may provide legislators and 
presidents with electoral coattails (Jones, 1997; Samuels, 2003). In cases where electoral districts 
coincide with territorial units (such as states and provinces), the degree of “partisan harmony” 
(the extent of support for the president throughout the territorial units) affects policymaking. For 
example, when national leaders lack support at the subnational level, “vertically” divided 
government, combined with the absence of sufficient resources to buy support, could complicate 
the approval of a president’s agenda (Rodden and Wibbels, 2002). In Argentina, it contributes to 
creating a political system that tends to operate more on the basis of exchanges of provincial 
support of national policies for fiscal benefits to the provinces. 
  Finally, the link between federal and subnational politics is also fiscal. In particular, 
federal fiscal arrangements define tax and expenditure assignments between different levels of 
government, the design of intergovernmental transfers, and the borrowing autonomy of 
subnational units (Stein, 1999). In situations of high fiscal decentralization, subnational 
authorities control resources that render them powerful actors, even affecting policy outcomes at 
the national level.
49 In Brazil, in the early 1990s, governors would challenge the central 
government’s fiscal sustainability to gain leverage in their negotiations (IDB, 2005). 
  Some of the links between federal political institutions and the features of the policy 
game are included in Table 5. For example, as mentioned above, higher fiscal prerogatives for 
                                                           
49 For example, in many federal countries, while expenditure is decentralized, most revenues are collected at the 
center and then transferred to the subnational governments. This creates an incentive for subnational governments to 
overspend from the common pool of resources, enjoying the full benefits of overspending without internalizing its 
costs. If this tendency is not limited by the central government, the opportunistic behavior of subnational 
governments may result in dire economic consequences: excessive spending, fiscal deficits, debt crisis, and  
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the subnational authorities (measured in terms of the degree of fiscal decentralization and 
vertical fiscal imbalance), particularly when they can challenge fiscal discipline at the central 
level (measured in terms of the index of budgetary numerical restrictions for the subnational 
level), can increase the number of relevant policy players, and affect the ability to certain 
agreements (e.g., federal tax-sharing agreements) or generate inflexible policies (e.g., higher 
earmarks). 
 
6. Political Parties and Party Systems 
 
Political parties are organizations that seek influence in a state, often by attempting to occupy 
positions in government by “aggregating” interests in the society (Ware, 1996). They have also 
been regarded as instruments used by politicians to gain political office by reducing transaction 
costs (Aldrich, 1995). In terms of transactions with citizens, political parties reduce information 
costs by association with party labels and ideologies. In terms of transactions within the party 
system, political parties reduce the number of players in charge of transactions.  
The role of political parties and party systems in the policymaking process is twofold. In 
some countries, political parties act directly in the policymaking process by contributing to the 
definition and articulation of policy programs and engaging effectively in public policy debates. 
In others, party system characteristics affect the policymaking process indirectly by influencing 
the workability of executive-legislative relations, the possibilities for coordination in congress, 
and the incentives of elected officials: that is, the extent to which they focus on adopting and 
implementing public policies consistent with a broader public good. 
The characteristics identified in the literature, especially those that are most relevant for 
the focus of this document, include the degree of party system institutionalization, the 
programmatic character of parties and party systems, the degree of fragmentation, the level of 
party discipline, and the degree of party system nationalization, as well as the nature of campaign 
finance.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
difficulties in macroeconomic management and fiscal adjustment at the national level (Wibbels, 2000; Rodden and 
Wibbels, 2002).  
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Party System Institutionalization 
 
Party systems can be considered institutionalized when the patterns of interparty competition are 
relatively stable; parties have fairly stable and deep bases of societal support; parties and 
elections are viewed as legitimate and as the sole instruments for determining who governs; and 
party organizations are characterized by reasonable stable rules and structures (Mainwaring and 
Scully, 1995). In terms of the PMP framework, institutionalized party systems are likely to 
promote longer time horizons, greater policy consistency over time and a greater potential for 
intertemporal agreements, since commitments made by current party leaders are more likely to 
be respected in the future. In contrast, electoral competition in noninstitutionalized party systems 
is volatile, and linkages between parties and voters are weaker, which may result in 
noncooperative outcomes in the policymaking process, and a high degree of policy volatility. 
 
Programmatic Character of Party Systems 
Programmatic parties compete for and obtain support on the basis of their policy orientations and 
accomplishments, and parties distinguish themselves in terms of their policy proposals or 
ideological orientation. Programmatic parties are usually contrasted with clientelistic parties. 
The latter compete for and obtain support based on the distribution of selective material 
incentives to voters (such as public sector jobs, governmental contracts, cash, or meals) in 
networks of direct exchange and are judged by voters primarily on their ability to deliver these 
particularistic benefits (Kitschelt, 2000).  
These characteristics affect the outcomes of the policymaking process in contrasting 
ways. On the one hand, if an institutionalized party system is also programmatic, then political 
parties are likely to favor more public regarding policies, since parties represent different policy 
options and voters can hold them accountable on that basis. On the other hand, clientelistic 
parties are mostly interested in maintaining their narrow bases of support and keeping their 
electoral machines running. Thus the usual outcome of exchanges between clientistic parties are 
private regarding policies.   
 
Party System Fragmentation 
 
The degree of fragmentation is usually captured through the number of parties that regularly 
obtain a significant share of the votes and/or seats in the legislature (Lijphart 1994). In terms of  
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the PMP framework, the level of fragmentation could influence the number of players in charge 
of policymaking. In presidential contexts, it limits the size of presidential legislative contingents 
and increases the number of partners with which the president must form coalitions. Higher 
fragmentation would be expected to complicate executive-legislative relations, increase the 
transaction costs of obtaining policy agreements, and limit policy adaptability. 
As mentioned, party system fragmentation is a function of the electoral system: the 
proportional or majoritarian design of the system, the size of electoral districts, the nature of the 
formula for converting votes into seats, and the concurrence of presidential and legislative 
elections. However, electoral rules do not affect fragmentation in isolation. In fact, the number of 
parties is determined by the interaction of electoral systems, the number of salient social and 
economic cleavages, and the political history of each country (Cox and Amorim Neto, 1997). 
 
Party Discipline 
Party discipline corresponds to the extent that representatives of the same party vote in similar 
ways in the assembly (Rasch, 1999). As mentioned, party discipline is a key factor shaping the 
president’s ability to pass his agenda, and it depends on several institutional configurations. For 
example, it is partly a result of the role party leaders play in nominating and influencing the 
reelection chances and future political careers of members of congress. However, factors other 
than candidate selection matter as well, including party leaders’ roles in organizing the work of 
the legislature (such as appointing committee members and chairpersons, and agenda power).  
 
Party System Nationalization 
Another dimension of political party systems is their level of nationalization: that is, the extent to 
which parties are national in scope and receive similar levels of support throughout the country 
(Jones and Mainwaring, 2003). Nationalization matters for policymaking because it affects the 
number of players interacting in the PMP and executive-legislative relations, and thus the outer 
features of public policies. 
When a party system is said to be nationalized, the executive (generally a nationally 
oriented political player) may be able to pass his or her agenda through the legislature more 
easily by negotiating with a few key national party leaders. The level of nationalization may also 
affect the quality of public polices. When the territorial distribution of a party’s vote is relatively 
homogenous, politicians will be more likely to treat its constituent units in a similar fashion in  
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areas such as fiscal and social policy. Additionally, as national issues (such as macroeconomic 
stability) are central to the careers of both the executive and legislators, politicians have 
incentives to work for delivering national public goods, instead of focusing on delivering 
particularistic benefits. In contrast, in highly denationalized party systems, parties tend to favor 
their bases of support and may use different mechanisms (the budget process, discretionary 




Finally, it is important to consider the relevance of campaign financing. Particularly in the 
media, campaign financing is analyzed as the means for interest groups to influence and obtain 
favors from politicians. In that context, introducing restrictions to campaign financing seems 
straightforward. However, in the context of the framework it is important to consider what the 
role of campaign financing is and what the potential consequences of eliminating or restricting 
campaign financing might be. Campaign financing has a role as an instrument for political 
leaders to increase party discipline and as a mean of entry into politics; therefore, it could affect 
the number of players and their discount factor. First, in those systems where party leaders have 
no control over nomination and legislative organization does not provide them with tools to 
influence the party’s legislators, having control of campaign financing could be an instrument for 
increasing discipline. Second, campaign funds could be the only way for some challengers to get 
into office when voters are not informed of the policy positions of the candidates. Incumbents 
usually have an advantage because of factors such as name recognition and seniority, and 
campaign spending restrictions may therefore protect the incumbents against new entrants (and 
hence, increase the duration of politicians).  Consequently, campaign finance regulation could 
have an impact on the market for politicians on both the demand and supply sides, and thus, 
indirectly, it could affect government programs and policies. 
  Tables 6a and 6b summarize the impact of fragmentation, polarization, 
institutionalization, and nationalization on the determinants of cooperation, and the specific 
impact of the different components of electoral rules on the characteristics of party systems. For 
example, district magnitude affects fragmentation, which in turn affects the number of players. 
None of the partial relationships should be considered in isolation because each one of the 




Several characteristics of bureaucracies and public employment are important for policymaking 
because these characteristics can affect both the quality of implementation and the enforcement 
of political agreements (Zuvanic and Iacovello, 2005). Two characteristics in particular help 
explain different bureaucratic types: the degree of autonomy (the extent to which effective 
guarantees of professionalism in the civil service are in place and the degree to which civil 
servants are protected from arbitrariness and politization); and the technical capacities of 
bureaucracies (the degree to which the bureaucracy has salary compensation and evaluation 
systems).  Meritocratic  bureaucracies are characterized by high levels of autonomy and 
capacity. In contrast, clientelistic bureaucracies lack both attributes, and thus function mainly as 
a private source of employment managed by governing political parties. Between these two 
extremes,  administrative bureaucracies enjoy autonomy but lack a high degree of capacity, 
while parallel bureaucracies are characterized by high degrees of capacity and low autonomy.  
The advantages of meritocratic bureaucracies for policymaking are numerous. First, an 
organized civil service can help politicians fortify their commitment by delegating decision-
making authority to autonomous institutions,
50 reducing the capacity to reverse their decisions in 
response to short-term considerations. Because the effectiveness of policies depends on the 
widespread belief that they will be sustained over time, meritocratic bureaucracies, characterized 
by independence and long tenure of public employees, are an important part of the set of political 
institutions conducive to policy outcomes. The evidence seems to indicate that better 
bureaucratic types are strongly associated with better policy features (IDB, 2005). Table 7 
summarizes the impact of the capacity and autonomy of the bureaucracy on the determinants of 
cooperation. 
All bureaucracies are not created equal. In fact, the extent to which bureaucracies enjoy 
certain characteristics depends on several factors. One important determinant of the organization 
of the civil service is the strategic interaction between other players in the policymaking process 
(such as legislatures and executives), their time horizons, the degree of interest alignment, and 
the distribution of the benefits of patronage (Geddes, 1991; Spiller and Urbiztondo ,1994). For 
example, if legislatures and executives differ in their time horizons (i.e., legislators last longer 
                                                           
50 The analysis is somewhat similar to the rationale behind the literature on central bank independence and 
independent regulatory agencies.    
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than presidents) as well as in their political interests (i.e., divided government), then it is possible 
that legislators will try to diminish the ability of the president to appoint or remove bureaucrats 
discretionally in order to give public policies longer horizons. One way to do it could be by 
establishing civil service rules and public servant protection laws. The incentives of parties to 
adopt meritocratic or clientelistic civil services will also affect the organization of the 
bureaucracy. If the party system has one or a few large parties, and there is an asymmetrical 
distribution of the benefits of patronage, then a clientelistic bureaucracy is likely to be sustained 
over time. On the other hand, if the benefits of patronage among the larger parties are more 
evenly distributed, then parties have incentives to reform the civil service system, and reduce 
patronage (Geddes, 1991). In the case of Paraguay, public employment has been chosen as the 
token of exchange between the executive and the legislature, which has greatly undermined the 
capacity of the bureaucracy (Molinas et al., 2006). 
The characteristics of bureaucracies are not always “chosen” by strategic political actors. 
In fact, historical legacies are important determinants of the attributes of civil services as well. 
For example, countries may inherit an autonomous and competent bureaucratic apparatus from 
colonial times, which remains in place long after independence, for path-dependent reasons. 
Such is the case of several countries that were former British colonies (e.g., India).    
 
8. Other Institutions 
 
This document has focused on the workings of traditional political institutions. However, other 
relevant institutional dimensions play a role in defining the incentives and behavior of political 
actors in the design and implementation of policies—particularly in Latin America. This section 
considers a few examples.  
  Countries’ history of the voting franchise along dimensions such as age, gender, literacy, 
and geography has a potential impact on the economic and political landscape. This legacy may 
be important in understanding the interaction of voters with political parties, and the workings of 
party systems, for example. In countries that lack a long-established democratic tradition, the 
link between voters and parties is weak, and party competition may be volatile. In such contexts, 
personalism (the personal draw of individual candidates because of their charisma, their 
background, or their status as a celebrity, for example) plays a much greater role in voting, 
increasing outsider candidates’ chances of reaching high executive posts.  
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An additional element is the role played by institutional interruptions—particularly by the 
extent and frequency of military governments. Recurrent institutional interruptions tend to 
reduce the stability of rules and conspire against the development of policymaking capabilities of 
key democratic political institutions such as legislatures or supreme courts. Regardless of the de 
jure institution of the country, frequent institutional changes reduce the time horizons of political 
players, who may only prioritize short-term political benefits when bargaining over policy. Thus 




This document has presented a survey of the political science and political economy literature to 
highlight the institutions and actors that are important within the context of the policymaking 
process framework developed by Tommasi and others. As the introduction points out, several 
characteristics of the policymaking game determine the features of policies. These include the 
number of actors, their incentives, their discount factors, and the arenas where transactions take 
place. Every one of the institutions presented in this document has some impact on these 
characteristics.  
In the case of the executive branch, the type of political regime, the extent of presidential 
powers, and the method of election and selection can affect the number of agents with influence 
on policymaking, their stability (and discount rate factor), the availability of enforcement 
mechanisms, and the arenas where transactions take place. As the power of the president 
increases, the government’s capacity to generate changes and new policies tends to increase as 
well.  While a weak executive must work its policies through the legislature, in strong 
presidential systems, the president can try to force policies unilaterally through executive 
decrees, and political transactions tend to occur in less formal environments.  
The role of the legislature in the policymaking process is affected by the powers of the 
president but also by its own institutional framework; particularly, the rules of access to the 
legislature and the rules that organize the workings of the legislature. These institutions 
determine the number of relevant political actors and their relative duration by having some 
bearing on the number of political parties that can compete successfully for legislative seats, the 
term of the appointments, and the legislators’ discipline to the party, their source of support and 
allegiance, and their incentives for specializing and building up their capabilities. These  
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characteristics of the political system help to explain the type of negotiations that take place in 
congress and whether congress can become a relevant arena for policymaking. . 
The impact of congress on policymaking is not independent of the role of the judiciary. 
The judiciary can have a role as an impartial referee, enforcing the acts of the other branches, 
and can have its own role in the policymaking process as a policy player. While the judiciary has 
usually been regarded as an additional veto player, we should also stresses its role as facilitator 
of intertemporal cooperation. By providing enforcement to the agreements achieved by other 
actors, it increases the durability of agreements and policies, and consequently, the present value 
of cooperation. Thus it could facilitate the adoption of stable and adaptable policies. The 
comparative analysis of country cases shows that independent judiciaries tend to favor those 
features of public policies. 
The organization of government at he local level matters as well, because subnational- 
level politicians can also influence national policies. The main channel of influence is the 
capacity of subnational level politicians (local party bosses) to exercise control over national 
level politicians (governors’ influence on national legislators, for example). The method of 
selecting those national level politicians is usually the main determinant: the degree of influence 
will be higher if national politicians are elected at the local level where local party bosses can 
influence the selection of candidates. 
Across all the institutions surveyed, the role of political parties is essential in explaining 
the particular dynamics in each branch of government, and across branches. The degree of 
institutionalization and nationalization of political parties, their programmatic character, the 
fragmentation of the party system, and their internal discipline are all characteristics that affect 
the number of players, their incentives, the arenas where decisions are taken, and so forth. The 
particular characteristics of each party system interact differently in each institutional context, 
creating a very distinct policymaking process. 
The PMP framework stresses the need for a systemic approach, one that emphasizes 
configurations of institutions and interactive effects. Yet in order to understand these interactions 
among multiple institutional dimensions, it is important to first understand each of them 
individually, focusing on the variety of rules in place in Latin America, and the way they affect 
the incentives of political actors and the way they play the game. For this reason, this document 
has focused on a number of distinct institutional dimensions of democratic systems and studied  
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them one at a time. Hopefully, this document will provide researchers with the tools necessary to 
embark on the fascinating analysis of country cases not only in Latin America but also in other 
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Table 3. Legislatures          
Determinants of cooperation  Political Institutions     Political Institutions    
   Electoral rules  Measures  Structure  Organization  Measures 
Number of players  Electoral formula: PR vs. Plurality 
District Magnitude: low M vs. high M
Ballot structure: Open vs.Closed 
Threshold (u): Low vs. High 
Malapportionment 
 
If Party Discipline (PD), then:  
PR,high M (+) vs. Plurality,low M (-) 
If no PD, then PR (?) vs. Plurality (?)
PR,closed (-) vs. PR, open (+) 
Low u (+), High u (-) 
















Symmetrical (-) vs. 
Asymmetrical (+) 
Committee System: 
# of committees, size of committees 
High (+) vs. Low (-) 
 
Agenda power 
Decentralized (+) vs. Centralized (-) 




Time horizons  Candidate selection: party leadership 
(-) vs. constituency (+) 
term limits: no (+) vs. yes (-) 




   Committee Allocation/Assignment 
Seniority (+) vs. Party (-) 
 
Committee System: 
# of committees, size of committees 





Congress Capabilities Index 
Timing and observability of moves  See Table "Presidents and Cabinet"    
Enforcement technologies                
Legislature as arena  Candidate selection: party leadership 
(-) vs. constituency (+) 
Term limits: no (+) vs. yes (-) 




   Committee Allocation/Assignment 
Seniority (+) vs. Party (-) 
 
Committee System: 
# of committees, size of committees 





Congress Capabilities Index 
Ratio committee size 







Table 4. Judiciary           
Determinants of  
cooperation 
Characteristics of the Judiciary 
   Budget autonomy Appointment System  Terms and Tenure  Judicial Review powers 
Measures 
 
Number of players 
Low (-) vs. High 
(+) 
Political (-) vs. Merit (+)   Low (-) vs. High (+)  Budget-ratio % 
Independence of the 
Judiciacy index 
De facto judicial 
independence 
extent of review powers 
 
Time horizons 
   Political (-) vs. Merit (+)Lifetime (+) vs.  
short terms (-) 
   Tenure of supreme court 
justices 
Independence of the 
Judiciary index 
De facto judicial 
independence 
Timing and  
observability of moves 
   Political (-) vs. Merit (+)Lifetime (+) vs.  
short terms (-) 
Low (-) vs. High (+)  Extent of review powers 
Independence of the 
Judiciary index 
De facto judicial 
independence 
Enforcement technologies  Low (-) vs. High 
(+) 
Political (-) vs. Merit (+)   Low (-) vs. High (+)  Tenure of supreme court 
justices 
Independence of the 
Judiciary index 
De facto judicial 
independence 
 
Legislature as Arena 










Table 6A. Party Systems (I)   
Political Institutions  Measures  Determinants of  
cooperation  Electoral rules    
Fragmentation (+) 
Party Discipline (-) 
% seats of president's party 
% seats of largest opposition party 
% seats of government's party/parties 
% seats of largest parties 
Effective number of parties in government 
Parties in opposition 
Minority governments 
% of state governments controlled by the 
party of the president 
Effective number of parties 
Disproportionality Index 
Degree of particularism 
Rice Index of Party Unity 
Institutionalization (-)  Party Institutionalization Index 
Polarization (+)  Ideological self-placement of parties  
Programmatic Parties Index 
Number of players 
Nationalization (-)  Party System Nationalization Score 
Time horizons  Institutionalization (+)  Party Institutionalization Index 
Average age of parties 
Timing and  
observability of moves 
Denationalization (-)  Party System Nationalization Score 
Enforcement technologies       
Legislature as Arena  Institutionalization (+)  Party Institutionalization Index 
Party System Nationalization Score  
Reelection rates (legislators) 
 
Table 6B. Party Systems (II)        
Characteristics  Electoral rules    
   Electoral formula  District magnitude  Ballot structure  Candidate selection  Timing 
Fragmentation  Legislature: PR (+) 
vs. Plurality (-) 
Executive: Runoff (+) 
vs. Plurality (-) 
High M (+) vs.  
Low M (-) 
Open (+) vs.  
Closed (-) 
   Concurrent (-) vs.  
Non-concurrent (+)
Mid-term (+) 
Polarization  PR (+) vs. Plurality (-) High M (+) vs.  
Low M (-) 
        
Institutionalization        Open (-) vs.  
Closed (+) 




Nationalization     Single National 
District (+) vs.  
Multimember (-) 
Closed (+) vs. 
Open (-) 
National party leaders 
(+)  
vs. Constituency (-) 






Table 7. Bureaucracies    
Determinants of  
cooperation 
Characteristics of bureaucracies 
   Capacity  Autonomy 
Measures 
Number of players  Yes (+) vs. 
No (-) 
Yes (+) vs. No (-)  Functional Capacity Index 
Bureaucratic Merit Index 
Bureaucratic Efficiency Index 
 
Index of Civil Service System 
Development 
Time horizons  Yes (+) vs. 
No (-) 
Yes (+) vs. No (-)  Bureaucratic Merit Index 
Timing and  
observability of moves 
        
Enforcement technologies  Yes (+) vs. 
No (-) 
Yes (+) vs. No (-)  Functional Capacity Index 
Bureaucratic Merit Index 
Bureaucratic Efficiency Index 
 





Appendix      
      
Measure Description Table  Source 
Presidential party's  
chamber contingent 
% of seats held by  
the president's party in legislature 
Executive Jones  (2005) 
Index of political particularism  The degree to which individual politicians 
can further their careers by appealing to 
narrow geographic constituencies on the 
one hand, or party constituencies n the 
other. The index, ranging from 0 to 2,  
has 3 components: a) ballot, b) pool, c) vote, 
with higher values indicating higher degree 
of particularism 
Executive/Legislature  Carey and Shugart (1995)
Gaviria et al. (2003) 
Rice index of party unity  Measures the level of discipline of a given 
party in a given legislative vote. The index 
ranges from 0, when a party is evenly split 
on any legislative vote, to 100, when all 
members of a party vote together. The 
formula is R = ayes-nays / (ayes+nays)*100
Executive/Legislature Carey  (2002) 
Saiegh (2005) 
Years in Office  How many years has the chief executive 
been in office?  
Executive  Database of Political 
Institutions 
Executive Finite Term in Office  Is there a finite term in office? (1 if yes, O if 
no) Is there a constitutional limit on the 
number of years the executive can serve 
before new elections must be called? 
Deviating from the convention, a 0 is 
recorded if a limit is not explicitly stated. This 
gets a 0 in the cases where the constitution 
with year limits is suspended or unenforced.
Executive  Database of Political 
Institutions 
Size of cabinet  Refers to the number of ministers of  
"cabinet rank," excluding undersecretaries, 
parliamentary secretaries, ministerial 
alternates, etc.  
Executive  Cross-national                   
time-series database 
Cabinet stability 1  Average number of different individuals that 
served in a given ministry in a given time 
period 
Executive  Martinez Gallardo (2005)  
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Cabinet stability 2  The average time, in days, spent in office by 
all cabinet officers in a given year, divided 
by 365. The measure ranges between 0.003 
(=1/365, a situation in which each minister 
lasts one day in office) to 1 (all ministers last 
the full year).  
Executive  Amorim Neto and  
Borsani (2004) 
Cabinet Coalescence index  The index measures the amount of deviation 
from proportionality between ministries and 
legislative seats held by the parties joinining 
the executive when the cabinet is formed. 
The index formula is:1 - 1/2 å (Si-Mi), where 
Mi is the percentage of ministries that party i 
receives when the cabinet is appointed, and 
Si is the percentage of seats commanded by 
the parties joining the cabinet when the 
cabinet is appointed. The index ranges 
between 0 and 1, with higher numbers 
indicating a higher degree of cabinet 
coalescence.  
Executive  Amorim Neto (2002) 
Constitutional powers index  The average of three variables: 1) proactive 
powers, 2) reactive powers, and 3) plebsicite 
powers of presidents. Index on a scale of 0-
1, with higher numbers indicating greater 
constitutional powers 
Executive IDB  (2005) 
Proactive powers  These are powers that contribute to the 
president’s ability to unilaterally change the 
status quo. They have two components: (1) 
decree and agenda-setting powers (whether 
the president has the power to directly make 
laws by issuing decrees) and (2) budgetary 
powers (whether the president has the 
power to prepare the budget with few 
interventions from the congress). Aggregate 
index on a scale of 0–1, with higher 
numbers representing greater powers of the 
president. 
Executive IDB  (2005)  
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Reactive powers  These are powers that allow the president to 
oppose efforts by the legislature to change 
the status quo. They have three 
components: (1) package veto (power of the 
president to block the enactment of a law 
approved by the congress to which he 
objects); (2) partial veto (power of the 
president to veto particular provisions of an 
approved bill to which he objects); and (3) 
exclusive initiative (relates to cases in which 
the constitution gives the president the 
exclusive right to introduce legislation in 
specific policy areas). Aggregate index on a 
scale of 0–1, with higher numbers 
representing greater powers of the 
president. 
Executive IDB  (2005) 
Legislative production  I) Laws initiated by legislators as % of total 
laws approved 
II) Laws initiated by executive as % of total 
laws approved 
III) Bills approved as % of bills introduced 
(presidents vs.legislators) 
IV) Laws vetoed as % of laws approved by 
Congress 
V) Vetoes overridden as % of total vetoes 
VI) % of Laws vs. Decrees 
Executive/Legislature Saiegh  (2005) 
Presidents' legislative  
success rates 
The number of executive proposals 
approved in the legislature, divided by the 
total number of proposals introduced by the 
executive in a given period 
Executive/Legislature Saiegh  (2005) 
Effective number of legislative 
parties 
The index measures the number of parties 
obtaining seats in the legislature weighted 
by the proportion of seats they obtain. It is 
calculated by taking the inverse of the sum 
of the square of all parties' seat shares. 
Legislature/Parties Laakso  and 
Taagepera (1979) 
Least square index  
of disproportionality 
The index captures the deviations between 
the vote and seat percentage obtained by 
each political party, contesting seats in a 
given election. The vote/seat differences for 
each party are squared and then added; this 
total is divided by 2; and then the square 
root of this value is taken. Higher values 
indicate higher disproportionality.   
Legislature/Parties  Payne et al. (2002)  
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Degree of Malapportionment  A measure of inequality of representation, 
interpreted as the discrepancy between the 
shares of legislative seats and the shares of 
population held by electoral districts. The 
index is calculated by taking the absolute 
value of the difference between each 
district’s seat and population shares,  
adding them, and then dividing by two. 
Higher values indicate higher levels of 
malapportionment. 
Legislature/Federalism  Samuels and Snyder 
(2001) 
Reelection rates (legislators)  Average percentage of legislators in the  
legislature that are reelected in the following 
legislature 
Legislature Saiegh  (2005) 
Average experience of legislators  Assessment of the average years of 
experience of legislators (E), calculated on 
the basis of the reelection rate of legislators 
(r) and the average length of the legislative 
term (D). Formula:  
E = D/2 + r D 
Legislature IDB  (2005) 
Degree of bicameral symmetry  The index captures the institutional 
prerogatives of bicameral legislatures. The 
index ranges from 0 to 4, with higher values 
indicating higher symmetry between the 
chambers. 
Legislature  Llanos and Nolte (2003) 
Ratio committee/size  Ratio of number of committees to size of 
legislature 
Legislature Saiegh  (2005) 
Committee specialization  Average number of committee memberships
per legislator 
Legislature Saiegh  (2005) 
Congress Capability Index  This is an aggregate index calculated as the 
simple average of the following eight 
components: (1) confidence in congress, (2) 
effectiveness of lawmaking bodies, (3) 
average experience of legislators, (4) 
percentage of legislators with university 
education, (5) number of committee 
memberships per legislator, (6) committee 
strength, (7) whether congress is a good 
place to build a career, and (8) technical 
expertise of legislators. All components 
are rescaled to a scale of 1–3, such that the 
aggregate index is on a scale of 1–3, with 
higher levels indicating better congressional 
capabilities of legislators. 
Legislature IDB  (2005) 
Budget ratio %  The ratio of the public sector's budget 
dedicated to the justice sector 
Judiciary Sousa  (2005) 
Independence of the Judiciary  
Index 
Measures the degree to which the judiciary 
is independent of the political influence of 
members of government, citizens, or firms. 
Judiciary IDB  (2005)  
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De facto judicial independence  Simple average of eight components, each 
of which is coded between 0 and 1 or 
normalized to vary between 0 and 1: (1) 
Effective average term length of the 
members of the highest court; (2) Deviations 
between actual term length and that which 
would be expected given legal setting; (3) 
Have members of the highest court been 
removed before the end of their terms? (4) 
Number of times the number of judges has 
been changed since 1960; (5) Have 
incomes of judges at least remained 
constant since 1960? (6) Has the budget of 
the highest court at least remained constant 
in real terms since 1960? (7) How often 
have the relevant articles of the constitution 
(or the law on which the highest court is 
based) been changed since 1960? and (8) 
In how many cases has one of the other 
government branches remained inactive 
when its action was necessary for a decision 
of the highest court to become effective? 
Judiciary IDB  (2005) 
Tenure of supreme court judges  Average tenure (years) of supreme court 
judges for a given time period 
Judiciary Sousa  (2005) 
Degree of expenditure decentralization  The proportion of total government 
expenditures executed by subnational 
governments 
Federalism Stein  (1999) 
Degree of vertical fiscal imbalance  The ratio of intergovernmental transfers from 
the central government, including tax 
sharing, over total revenues (own plus 
transferred) of the subnational level. 
Federalism Stein  (1999) 
Index of discretionality in the system  
of intergovernmental transfers 
The index measures the degree of discretion 
of the central level of government regarding 
the transfer of resources to subnational-level 
governments. The index results from the 
addition of the score obtained in two 
aspects:1) Mechanisms to determine the 
amount of the transfers, 2) mechanisms to 
determine the distribution of the transfer 
among jurisdictions. The index varies within 
a range of 0 to 4, with higher levels 
indicating a higher degree of discretion.   
Federalism  IDB (1997), Stein (1999) 
Index of borrowing autonomy of state and 
local governments 
The index measures the degree of 
borrowing autonomy of subnational-level 
governments. The index is built according to 
the following criteria: 1) ability to borrow, 2) 
authorization, 3) borrowing constraints, 4) 
limits on use of debt. The index varies 
between 0 and 4, with higher values 
indicating higher degree of borrowing 
autonomy. 
Federalism  IDB (1997), Stein (1999)  
  66
Party Institutionalization Index  Following Mainwaring and Scully (1995), this 
is an aggregate index which is an average of 
four component measures: (1) the stability of 
inter-party competition, (2) the 
extensiveness of parties’ roots in society, (3) 
the legitimacy of parties and elections, and 
(4) the strength of party organizations. Index 
on a scale of 0–100, with higher levels 
indicating more institutionalized party 
systems. 
Party Systems  Mainwaring and Scully 
(1995) and  
IPES (2006) 
Ideological self-placement of parties  Legislators from different parties are asked 
to place their parties on an ideological scale 
from 1 (Left) to 10 (Right). 
Party Systems  Jones (2005) 
Programmatic parties Index  This index measures the extent to which 
parties are programmatic. This in turn is 
derived from three components: (1) the level 
of programmatic politics among party 
supporters (electorate), (2) the level of 
programmatic politics among the party elite 
(legislators), and (3) the extent of electoral 
volatility in the country. The following 
equation is used to calculate the index from 
the components: Prog. Parties = (Prog. 
Electorate + Prog. Elite) − Electoral 
Volatility. 
The index is constructed on a scale of 0–8, 
with higher levels indicating more 
programmatic parties. 
Party Systems  Jones (2005) 
Party System Nationalization Score  Following Jones and Mainwaring (2003), the 
PSNS is calculated as the sum over all 
parties of 1minus the Gini coefficient for the 
distribution of each party’s vote (its party 
nationalization score [PNS]), multiplied by its 
share of the national valid vote. 
Party Systems  Jones and  
Mainwaring (2003) 
Functional Capacity Index  Measures the degree to which the 
bureaucracy has salary compensation 
systems and systems for evaluating the 
performance of public officials. Index on a 
scale of 0–100, with higher levels indicating 
systems with higher technical capacities and 
more incentives 
for performance. 
Bureaucracies IDB  (2005) 
Bureaucratic Merit Index 
 
Measures the degree to which effective 
guarantees of professionalism in the civil 
service are in place and the degree to which 
civil servants are effectively protected from 
arbitrariness, politicization, and rent-seeking. 
Index on a scale of 0–100, with higher levels 
indicating more autonomous bureaucratic 
systems. 
Bureaucracies IDB  (2005)  
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Bureaucratic Efficiency Index  Measures the degree to which the 
bureaucracy is efficient in assigning human 
capital, given a fiscal policy constraint. Index 
on a scale of 0–100, with higher levels 
indicating more efficient bureaucratic 
systems. 
Bureaucracies IDB  (2005) 
Index of Civil Service System  
Development 
Average of three indicators of the 
bureaucracy: (1) the Bureaucratic Merit 
Index, (2) the Bureaucratic Functional 
Capacity Index, and (3) the Bureaucratic 
Efficiency Index. Index on a scale of 0–100, 
with higher levels indicating more developed 
civil service systems. 
Bureaucracies IDB  (2005) 
 